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Not only humans eat meat: Companions, sentience and vegan politics 
 
Josh Milburn 
 
Abstract: This paper considers the under-analysed ethical issues involved in feeding flesh to companion 
animals, and, in particular, how cats ± nonhuman animals who may need to consume flesh to survive ± might 
fit into an animal rights-respecting, vegan, state. I cautiously take it for granted that the current ways cats are 
fed are ethically untenable, but suggest that only as a last resort could states endorse FDWV¶ extinction. Instead, 
this paper considers, but rejects, a rights-based ³VL]HPDWWHUV´DUJXPHQW± the suggestion that it is better to kill a 
small number of large creatures than a large number of small creatures ± as a solution. The paper then develops 
a moral risk argument to suggest that, though we have an obligation not to kill nonhuman animals who are 
plausibly sentient, such as shellfish, when the gains from doing so are very minor, we may be permitted to kill 
them when the gains are significant. In practice, this means that we are not permitted to kill these animals to 
satisfy our gastronomic curiosity, but we are when it allows us to avoid the need to make cats extinct. This 
suggestion, though, should be understood in the context of a broader vision of a society in which no sentient 
nonhuman animals are killed for consumption. As the argument necessarily relies on uncertainty, it could only 
ever be a temporary solution. 
 
Keywords: Companion animals, veganism, animal ethics, animal rights, food ethics, sentience, moral risk, 
cats, shellfish 
 
Not only humans eat meat, and this fact requires scrutiny from social philosophers, animal ethicists 
and other theorists of food. When we talk of food distribution, we generally think of food for human 
consumption, but our nonhuman animal (NHA) companions, especially dogs and cats, are also fed 
large amounts of flesh. If we violate the rights of NHAs when we slaughter them for human 
consumption, it intuitively follows that we do so when we slaughter them to feed our companions. 
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:KLOHWKH³SHWIRRG´LQGXVWU\DURVHSDUWLDOO\WRILQGDXVHIRUWKHE\-products of slaughter,1 not all 
of the flesh fed to companions is unfit or undesirable for human consumption, and, in any case, 
these by-products would no longer exist if meat-eating ceased or was radically diminished through 
wide-spread adoption of veganism, something now called for by increasing numbers of political 
theorists and applied philosophers. In this paper, I will explore the problems posed by carnivorous 
companions in a political community which has ceased or grossly diminished the exploitation of 
NHAs for food, such as the communities envisaged by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka or 
Alasdair Cochrane.2 
 
The importance of this issue for animal rights theorists should be clear: there is a pro tanto conflict 
between the obligations we have towards those NHAs for whom we care and the NHAs who we 
currently kill in order to feed them. However, and despite the focus of this paper, this is not a 
problem unique to animal rights. Thinkers who analyse obligations to NHAs in terms of suffering-
prevention rather than rights (including both utilitarians and deontologists who reject animal rights 
but recognise ethical obligations towards NHAs) must be concerned about the suffering of the 
NHAs killed for companions. Even if, in the case of human consumption, it is held that the 
VXIIHULQJ RI 1+$V LV RXWZHLJKHG E\ WKH SOHDVXUH RI WKRVH ZKR HDW WKHP WKDW ³ZKDW WKH
>VODXJKWHUHG@DQLPDOORVHVLVUHODWLYHO\PRGHVWZKDWZHJDLQLVFRQVLGHUDEOH´,3 it is unclear that the 
same reasoning would apply to companion consumption of NHA flesh.4 It may be that individual 
humans gain from companions being fed flesh, in that their companions are then sustained, but 
surely it is conceivable that the sustenance could be provided without the need to slaughter any 
sensitive NHAs; this is unlike the putative gains offered to humans by flesh-consumption. This 
means that, under these frameworks, the little-discussed issue of companion carnivory may be a 
pressing ethical problem, even while the oft-discussed issue of human carnivory is not. My 
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proposed solution should be amenable to thinkers in this broad category, as it offers the continued 
(human) benefits of companionship, while minimising the chances of the NHA suffering which that 
companionship currently entails. Environmentalists concerned with the climatic impact of meat-
production, too, should be interested in this question. The environmental impact of husbandry does 
not diminish because the resulting flesh is being fed to NHAs; as shall be seen, my proposed 
alternative FRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\UDGLFDOO\ORZHUWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWRIWKH³SHWIRRG´LQGXVWU\ 
in addition to reducing the violation of NHAs¶ rights and NHA suffering. Finally, this issue should 
be of interest to all who are concerned about the ethics of human consumption of NHA products. 
This is because consideration of the moral and political issues of feeding companions offers a new 
lens through which to consider the moral and political problems associated with human diets; an 
understanding of why (or if) it may sometimes be appropriate to feed NHAs foods which it is not 
appropriate to feed ourselves (or dependent humans) gives us a fuller understanding of the ethics of 
human food. 
 
I have indicated why comSDQLRQV¶GLHWVVKRXOGEHRILQWHUHVWWRPDQ\WKHRULVWV,ZLOOQRZUHWXUQWR
the central issue of this paper. Whether they conceive of the rights and interests of NHAs as a 
matter of justice or a matter of morality, animal ethicists must recognise that it is contrary to 
important interests possessed by sensitive NHAs to be raised and slaughtered for the production of 
³DQLPDO SURGXFWV´. Importantly, this holds whether the food is intended for human or NHA 
consumption. This point has been underappreciated in the animal ethics literature. A key exception 
to this trend is found in the work of Donaldson and Kymlicka, who advocate vegan diets for all 
members of society, human and otherwise. Even if companions may prefer carnivorous diets, the 
authors write, they ³GRQRWKDYHD ULJKW WR IRRG WKDW LQYROYHV WKHNLOOLQJRIRWKHUDQLPDOV´.5 This 
claim has been criticised,6 but, for the purposes of this article, I shall cautiously take it to have 
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merit, and explore its implications. The authors acknowledge that a fully vegan diet may be 
impossible for certain companions, such as cats.7 Cats, rather than omnivorous dogs, are the true 
³FDUQLYRURXV FRPSDQLRQV´ ,W VKRXOG QRW EH FRQWURYHUVLDO WR VD\ WKDW LI we ± biologically 
omnivorous humans, easily capable of surviving on a vegan diet ± have an obligation to eat only 
vegan foods, then we also have an obligation to feed our companion (omnivorous) dogs only vegan 
food. The issue is more difficult for cats, who may be unable to survive on a vegan diet.8 While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to answer whether, as an empirical matter, cats are able to 
comfortably survive on vegan diets, as humans are, a few words will be helpful. It is not hard to 
ILQGDQHFGRWDOHYLGHQFHRI³YHJDQFDWV´WKULYLQJRUZHEVLWHVVHOOLQJ³YHJDQFDWIRRG´'HVSLWHWKLV
veterinary scientist Kathryn Michel concludes that vegan diets for cats are problematic.9 The major 
difficulty, she explains, is that "[s]everal nutrients that are essential in the diets of cats are only 
found in animal source ingredLHQWV´ 0LFKHO FODLPV WKDW WKH QXWULWLRQDO DGHTXDF\ RI VRPH
FRPPHUFLDOO\ DYDLODEOH ³YHJDQ FDW IRRGV´ KDV EHHQ ³FDOOHG LQWR TXHVWLRQ´ WKRXJK VKH GRHV QRW
claim that a vegan diet for cats is necessarily unsuitable.10 I will not enter into this debate, as it is a 
question for veterinary nutrition, not social philosophy. Instead, I am interested in exploring 
VRFLHW\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKFDWVwere it the case that cats could not survive on a vegan diet. 
 
First, I shall consider the radical solution of ending the practice of keeping carnivorous companions 
by calling for the extinction of cats. This, I suggest, can be considered only when all other avenues 
have been exhausted. Next, I will consider two possible alternatives to extinction which have not 
previously been considered. There is an elegance to the arJXPHQWWKDW³VL]HPDWWHUV´,11 but I reject 
the possibility of killing a small number of large NHAs to feed our companions. Instead, I argue 
that feeding cats may present an exception to our general obligation not to kill those NHAs for 
whom sentience is unlikely, but possible, such as some bivalves. I explore this claim by assessing 
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bivalve-NLOOLQJWKURXJK'DQ0ROOHU¶VIUDPHZRUNRI³PRUDOULVN´,12 concluding that while moral risk 
gives us good reason to reject killing plausibly-sentient-NHAs for human consumption, it does not 
give us good reasons to reject killing plausibly-sentient-NHAs for cats. 
 
Extinctionism 
Given my assumptions that cats cannot thrive on a vegan diet and that the current way they are fed 
is ethically problematic, the most obvious solution is to stop keeping cats altogether. If cats are 
incapable of surviving outside of a mixed human/NHA society, then this necessitates their 
extinction.13 Approaches which endorse extinction are extinctionist. We can distinguish at least two 
kinds of extinctionism: abolitionist extinctionism endorses extinction for all NHA groups which 
exist because their members are kept for human purposes, as it is believed that keeping or bringing 
into existence a NHA for our purposes is inconsistent with respecting her as an individual with 
inherent value.14 On the other hand, selective extinctionism15 endorses extinction only for certain 
NHA groups. The approach begins with the assumption that some NHAs can be brought into 
existence and/or kept for human purposes (eg, companionship) justly, but that the practices 
necessarily associated with certain human purposes are unjust. The position thus calls for extinction 
only in those cases where injustice is inherent. As such, a selective extinctionist might call for the 
extinction of cats, as cats may not be able to be kept without slaughter. 
 
There has been much recent criticism of abolitionist extinctionism challenging its underlying 
philosophical presumptions,16 but such challenges do not hold against selective extinctionism, 
which does not endorse these problematic presumptions. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons 
for which we should be worried about selective extinctionism. I shall shortly offer three: An 
argument from value, an argument from desire and an argument from rights. Though none of these 
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(individually or together) is sufficient to conclude that selective extinctionism must be rejected a 
priori, I suggest that, collectively, these reasons lead to the conclusion that the selective extinction 
of cats because of problems associated with their diet could be endorsed only as a last resort, and so 
conclude that, first, we have good reason to make an effort to find alternative means of feeding cats, 
and, second, that making cats extinct is an option which carries a moderate amount of negative 
moral weight, whatever benefits it might have. 
 
The argument from value is simply that when making recommendations concerning companions, 
one cannot forget the very real and significant bonds which exist between particular cats and 
particular humans, or even particular humans and cats generally. In reality, certain humans share 
their lives with companions; the link between them is deeply meaningful, and companions are part 
of the family in a real, non-metaphorical way.17 These bonds might be valuable for their own sake, 
as well as being valued by the humans in question.18 Particular relationships of companionship form 
real and defining parts of the lives and identities of many people, and their lives would be 
significantly poorer without them. It may even be the case that, in the interests of pluralism, society 
would be poorer without these relationships, or without companions. If there is a value in diversity, 
then a society containing cat companions and enriched by the relationships certain people have with 
those cats is more valuable than an otherwise similar society without those cats and relationships. 
 
The pertinent question, then, given the problems associated with cat-keeping, is whether the value 
(whether framed objectively or subjectively) could be retained if the cats were replaced with 
something cat-like, such as an alternative companion. Greyhounds, including Italian and miniature 
varieties, might be perceived of as having a particularly feline personality, for instance.19 One way 
of responding to this challenge is to claim that banning cats is more like disallowing adults from 
Page 7 of 21 
 
 
This is an unedited draft version. For the final published version of this paper, please see: 
 
Milburn, Josh. 2015. Not only humans eat meat: Companions, sentience and vegan politics. Journal of Social 
Philosophy 46 (4): 449-62. DOI: 10.1111/josp.12131 
 
Available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12131/abstract 
having children than denying them access to some disfavoured commodity; any suggestion that cats 
could be replaced by something cat-like could perhaps be rejected on the same grounds we might 
reject the suggestion that children could be replaced in the parent-child relationship with something 
child-like. (My claim is not that people necessarily value children and cats for the same reason or 
that people necessarily value cats and children equally, but that the value people put in their 
relationships with cats is more like the value they put in their relationship with children than, say, 
the value they put in collecting stamps.) While this claim may make sense to those people who do 
love cats (or, analogously, other companions), it is unlikely to be fully convincing to others. 
Nonetheless, it does give us reason to seek out a just alternative to extinctionism. Selective 
extinctionism would necessitate the end of a kind of relationship which is plausibly valuable in a 
variety of ways, and there is an open question as to whether these values could be found elsewhere. 
 
The argument from desire does not appeal to these potentially contentious axiological concerns. The 
simple fact is that a great number of people do not want to stop keeping cats, and, more so, a great 
number of people are appalled at the idea that we would be permitted to make cats extinct, never 
mind the claim that we should make them extinct.20 Arguably, this alone gives us reason to be 
cautious about endorsing it. It is true that questions of justice override questions of collective 
decision-making, meaning that if it is unjust for us to continue keeping cats, then we should stop 
keeping them, regardless of who is opposed. However, given how unpopular a policy of selective 
extinctionism would be, it would be remiss of those who allow for the possibility to fail to explore 
all possible alternatives. Indeed, if it were found that there was a plausibly just alternative to 
selective extinctionism (such that we have two plausibly just solutions to an unjust situation) it 
seems that questions of collective decision-making would move to the forefront, over and above 
questions of justice. In such a case, it is not hard to imagine a political community strongly 
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favouring the solution which does not entail selective extinctionism. Therefore, not only do we have 
a good reason to pursue a just alternative to extinctionism out of simple respect for the desires of 
those who deeply object to it, but we have reasons, grounded in liberal political theory, to favour 
solutions to the problem which do not involve extinctionist policies. The argument from desire also 
ties to a broader issue sometimes stressed in animal rights literature;21 given the extreme 
unpopularity of extinctionism, it is a poor tactical move to endorse it. 
 
These somewhat anthropocentric-sounding arguments about human values and human preferences 
are perhaps not the only reasons that selective extinctionism is undesirable, and this is the where the 
argument from rights enters. It is at least plausible that any extinctionist programme necessarily 
involves violating the rights of individual cats.22 I will make no appeal to the value of human/cat 
relationships from the perspective of the cats; selective extinctionism via sterilisation would not 
result in any actually-existing cat being denied such a relationship. I shall also make no appeal to 
the rights of species, which I consider meaningless.23 Instead, I wish to ask whether the rights of 
individual cats would be violated by a programme of selective extinctionism. While any interests 
cats might have in reproductive autonomy could be outweighed by the greater interests of others, 
this is not to say that cats do not have such interests. Here, we can adopt the useful terminology of 
prima facie rights and concrete rights, the former being rights which we assume may exist once we 
KDYH FRQVLGHUHGDEHLQJ¶V LQWHUHVWV DQG Whe latter being the rights that exist once all things have 
been considered.24 Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to hold that cats have prima facie (though not 
necessarily concrete25) rights to reproductive and sexual autonomy,26 and we could also hold that 
cats have prima facie rights to bodily integrity and interaction with conspecifics. 
 
These four potential prima facie rights would be violated on a large scale if a programme of mass 
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sterilisation was initiated. Cats would lose the chance to produce young, and their sexual drives 
would be destroyed, removing their reproductive and sexual autonomy. Sterilisation could 
QHFHVVLWDWHLQYDVLYHDQGSHUKDSVSDLQIXORUGHELOLWDWLQJPHGLFDOSURFHGXUHVLQIULQJLQJXSRQFDWV¶
bodily integrity. As the remaining cats died, many would be denied the chance to interact with 
conspecifics. The violation of prima facie rights, however, does not make an action impermissible; 
it is the violation of concrete rights which is unjust. Importantly, whether these (potential) prima 
facie rights translate into concrete rights depends, in part, on whether they are compatible with the 
stronger interests that are possessed by many NHAs in not being slaughtered for cat consumption ± 
precisely the issue at hand. There are, then, plausible reasons to be concerned about selective 
extinctionism arising from the interests of cats; though I have not claimed that cats certainly do 
have a strong interest in a selective extinctionist programme not being carried out, it seems that we 
have reasons to think that they may. 
 
The arguments from value, desire and rights do not provide an overriding challenge to selective 
extinctionism. Nonetheless, they do, especially when considered together, provide a convincing 
case for attempting to find a just alternative to selective extinctionism, and provide a good prima 
facie reason to prefer a non-H[WLQFWLRQLVW VROXWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP RI FDWV¶ GLHWV ,I VHOHFWLYH
extinctionism is to be demanded, it can only be as a last resort. 
 
The largest and the smallest  
Donaldson and Kymlicka consider several potentially just solutions to the problem of how to feed 
cats, but express concerns about all.27 For the remainder of the paper, I will explore possibilities the 
SDLU GR QRW FRQVLGHU7KH ILUVW SRVVLELOLW\ LV WKDW ³VL]H PDWWHUV´28 Assuming that cats need to eat 
meat, perhaps it is better to kill a small number of large NHAs than a great many small ones.29 This 
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argument has clear merit for utilitarianism, but the idea may also be useful for those who endorse 
rights, as many allow rights-infringement in certain circumstances; even Robert Nozick is open to it 
in cases RI³FDWDVWURSKLFPRUDOKRUURU´.30 As a practical recommendation, we might claim that the 
rights of a few whales could be infringed to prevent the catastrophic moral horror (CMH) of 
selective extinctionism. I do not accept this, for three reasons. First, the argument works only if 
there is no way to avoid CMH that would not necessitate rights-infringement, and I shall shortly 
explore another possibility. Violating rights, even in a case of CMH, has to be a last resort. Second, 
actions in a one-off emergency situation (a situation in which we act to avoid CMH) are very 
different from actions which are established as the norm. That the size matters argument might be 
applicable in an emergency situation does not entail that we can use it to order society. Indeed, this 
application suggests that certain categories of beings would continue to have their rights infringed 
ad infinitum, which seems deeply unjust. Third, I am unconvinced that selective extinctionism is 
truly an example of CMH. I have argued that selective extictionism would be deeply regrettable, 
and that we have good reason to seek an alternative, but it is perverse to endorse the perpetuation of 
gross and systematic rights infringements/violations to avoid that which is merely regrettable. I 
conclude that a rights framework, even one making use of the size matters argument, could not 
justify the slaughter of whales to feed cats. 
 
Undeniably, the size matters argument captures an important observation: if they are sentient, eating 
a plate of oysters is going to inflict pain on a large number of creatures,31 while pain inflicted upon 
a single NHA could result in many plates of cow flesh. However, what is particularly interesting 
about the example of oysters is precisely that there is an open question about whether they can feel 
pain;32 something easily overlooked in a simple size matters argument. The question of sentience is 
obviously central to utilitarian accounts of animal ethics, but, if we allow that sentience grounds a 
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right to continued life,33 then it is clear that the issue is of importance to rights theorists, too: it 
determines the line between those animals who may be killed and those who may not.34 As such, if 
oysters were non-sentient, eating them would likely be ethically unproblematic, and they could be 
fed to cats; the problem with which I began this paper would be solved. However, it would be 
epistemically hubristic to express certainty about the non-sentience of oysters. Instead, I suggest, 
oysters are in a class of plausibly-sentient NHAs. Concerning human consumption of these beings, 
a precautionary principle is surely appropriate. We do not know whether these beings are sentient, 
but, if they are, we wrong them significantly in eating them ± better to treat them as if they were 
sentient and not eat them.35 To draw a parallel, if a driver has recently seen a (no longer visible) 
child playing with a box on the road and now drives towards that box, the sensible thing for her to 
do is avoid it. She does not know whether the child is in the box, but loses very little by getting out 
the car to move it or simply driving around it. Conversely, even if she was almost certain she saw 
the child head home, if she were to crush the box and it contained a child she would be, to a certain 
H[WHQW PRUDOO\ DQG SRVVLEO\ OHJDOO\ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH FKLOG¶V GHDWK )XUWKHU ZH ZRXOG KDYH
good reason to condemn her for her recklessness, even if no child was in the box. The cases are 
similar; we are uncertain, due to an open empirical question, about the permissibility of an action 
which it would be easy to avoid. Consequently, we do best to avoid said action, and are morally 
blameworthy if we choose not to. 
 
Moral risk 
The case against human consumption of shellfish (and other plausibly-but-not-likely-sentient-
NHAs) could be analysed in terms of moral risk. Meat-eating generally is often presented in such 
terms,36 but the argument typically rests upon moral, rather than empirical, uncertainty: the thought 
is that meat-eating is plausibly wrong, and this plausibility may entail a degree of obligation to 
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abstain from or avoid it. According to Dan Moller, who has presented a strong method of judging 
moral risk arguments, we analyse the moral risk of claim A by considering at least five factors: the 
likelihood that A is wrong, the extent to which A would be wrong, the costs faced if we do not 
endorse A, the extent to which we are responsible for our actions resulting from A, and whether not-
A also involves moral risk.37 7KHFODLP³LWLVPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOOVKHOOILVKIRUFRQVXPSWLRQ´
given the low probability of shellfish sentience, seems to represent a very low likelihood of a very 
large wrong, and we are completely responsible for the choices we make. In the case of human 
consumption of shellfish, we face very small costs in not endorsing the claim, and there is no 
chance38 of moral risk in choosing not to eat shellfish. As such, there is a strong moral risk 
argument against human consumption of shellfish. 
 
Unlike humans, cats cannot easily avoid the consumption of flesh. There are some costs in not 
allowing cats to eat shellfish (given the difficulty of feeding cats otherwise), and not feeding cats 
shellfish, given the alternatives, does seem to present a moderately large amount of moral risk (that 
is, it seems plausible that we are wrong about the acceptability of calling for selective extinctionism 
or other alternative ways to feed cats). As such, a moral risk argument against cat consumption of 
shellfish, if plausible at all, is significantly weaker than the moral risk argument against human 
consumption of shellfish. For Moller, moral risk involved in A gives us a reason, though not an 
overriding reason, to endorse not-A. However, such D UHDVRQ KROGV RQO\ ZKHQ ³D ODUJH
preponderance of the risk involved IDOOVRQRQHVLGH´;39 correspondingly, we have a reason not to 
kill shellfish for human consumption, but a moral risk argument against killing shellfish for cats 
seems considerably less convincing, if plausible at all. 
 
There is, however, an element that this argument has so far excluded. The problem could be 
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conceptualised as a choice between the high-risk, but one-off, option of selective extinctionism 
versus the lower risk, but ongoing, option of feeding shellfish to cats.40 Now, it is true that a moral 
risk argument should not be confused with a Benthamite expected utility argument. The latter, if 
applied to this kind of case, would compare how bad option1 would be if it were bad, multiplied by 
the likelihood that option1 is/would be bad, to how bad option2 would be if it were bad, multiplied 
by the likelihood that option2 is/would be bad. This kind of account seems to be inextricably linked 
to consequentialist frameworks. Nonetheless, a moral risk argument comparing selective 
extinctionism to the mass killing of shellfish indefinitely into the future could easily be seen to tip 
the scales of the argument in favour of selective extinctionism. However, once we consider that the 
choice is being made in a world in which there is scientific advancement, we see that we are not 
talking about the killing of shellfish indefinitely into the future, as the argument works only insofar 
as we remain uncertain of the existence of sentience in a given case. Let us assume that there is no 
group of NHAs A such that we are certain that A can form the basis of a suitable diet for cats and 
we are certain that A are nonsentient. Assume there are several groups of NHAs which are probably 
nonsentient and which could serve as the basis of a suitable diet for cats. Let us call the set of these 
groups B, the specific groups B1, B2« %n, and any given specific group Bx. B, therefore, 
demarcates the NHAs which I am suggesting could be fed to cats as an alternative to selective 
extinctionism. Further, assume that scientists are gradually working through B1-Bn in order to 
ascertain whether or not they are made up of sentient members. If it is found that Bx is made up of 
sentient members, then it is no longer a part of group B, and may no longer be fed to cats. However, 
if Bx is ascertained to be nonsentient, then Bx is, in fact, A; the dilemma has been averted, and we 
can simply feed A to cats. The point is that, eventually (even allowing for moderate scepticism), 
scientists will either find A, meaning that the moral risk argument is no longer needed, or they will 
ascertain that Bn, the final member of set B, does not belong in B, at which time the moral risk 
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argument will no longer work, and selective extinctionism, if no alternative feeding method is 
possible, will remain our only option. Put simply, the moral risk argument I have drawn does not 
endorse that we continue to feed shellfish to cats indefinitely; instead, it is necessarily a temporarily 
acceptable measure while we wait for (and encourage) scientific advancement in the area. Like all 
moral risk arguments, it relies upon our uncertainty; as our uncertainty dwindles, it must necessarily 
fade. 
 
One may object to this use of the moral risk argument for a number of reasons. First, Brian 
Weatherson41 claims that moral risk cannot ground a reason for action in the same way that 
prudential risk can. As such, he would claim, even if the precautionary argument is a moral risk 
argument, this should not motivate us. However, this particular moral risk argument is not of the 
kind to which Weatherson objects. The key uncertainty to which I appeal is not moral but empirical; 
I begin with the moral claim that sentient NHAs are rights-bearers and seek a way to understand our 
obligations to those NHAs who may be sentient. My uncertainty about making cats extinct, 
however, does (to a degree) appeal to a genuine moral uncertainty. Readers unhappy with moral risk 
arguments could remove this consideration and instead balance only the costs of not feeding cats 
shellfish (plus the aspects of the case against selective extinctionism which do not rest on moral 
uncertainty, such as the argument from desire) with the factual uncertainty concerning shellfish 
sentience. This would still leave a moral risk argument against human consumption of shellfish 
more plausible than a moral risk argument against cat consumption of shellfish, but not by as great a 
degree. Second, one may object that because I am not using the argument in the context of a moral 
uncertainty, I am misusing the argument. In response, I suggest thaW LV XQFOHDU ZK\ 0ROOHU¶V
argument could not be applied to cases of non-moral uncertainty. The situation is equivalent: we can 
choose from a number of options, our choice would be clear if we knew that x, we do not know that 
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x, and we hold that maybe x. Whether x is a moral or empirical claim should not matter. Third, one 
may object to my weighting of various factors. However, provided we exclude the generally 
implausible42 suggestion that humans lose a great deal through not eating shellfish and the callous-
sounding suggestion that there are no problems with selective extinctionism, it does not seem that 
tweaking the weighting of factors would result in substantially different results. 
 
One need not endorse 0ROOHU¶V particular approach in order to reach this conclusion. Take 
Alexander Guerroro¶V ³'RQ¶W.QRZ'RQ¶W.LOO´SULQFLSOH'.'., which holds that 
 
,I VRPHRQHNQRZV WKDW VKHGRHVQ¶W NQRZZKHWKHU D OLYLQJRUJDQLVPKDV VLJQLILFDQWPRUDO
status or not, it is morally blameworthy for her to kill that organism or to have it killed, 
unless she believes that there is something of substantial moral significance compelling her 
to do so.43 
 
*XHUURUR KROGV WKDW PHUH JXVWDWRU\ SOHDVXUH FDQQRW EH ³RI VXEVWDQWLDO PRUDO VLJQLILFDQFH´
(OSMS),44 but the OSMS bar does seem to be significantly lower than the CMH bar.45 Interestingly, 
one might endorse both, testing against CMH in cases where rights are definitely being violated and 
against OSMS in cases where the possession of rights is in question. DKDK can endorse the 
wrongness of killing shellfish when nothing OSMS is in the offing ± such as when humans enjoy 
the taste of shellfish ± but permit the killing of shellfish when something OSMS is at stake, such as 
when the continued existence of cats is in question. Again, as with the moral risk argument, this fact 
alone may not be considered sufficient to justify the feeding of shellfish to cats indefinitely into the 
future, but, again, we must remember that the use of shellfish for cat food is meant only as a 
temporary solution while uncertainty about the sentience of these beings remains. As such, 
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application of the DKDK principle to the consumption of shellfish, much like a consideration of 
moral risk, gives us a good reason to endorse the claim that it is wrong for us to kill shellfish for 
human consumption without giving us a good reason to endorse the claim that it is wrong for us to 
kill them for cat consumption.46  As the solution is, by virtue of the uncertainty upon which the 
argument relies, temporary, we can and should understand it as part of a wider vision of a future in 
which no sentient beings have to be killed or made to suffer for food. 
 
Conclusion 
This piece has responded to a dilemma: I have argued that selective extinctionism is something to 
EHDYRLGHGLISRVVLEOHEXW,KDYHDOVRFDXWLRXVO\DFFHSWHG'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND¶VGHPDQGWKDW
companions in a just society would have vegan diets, seeking an alternative which might be a 
possibility for those companions who are unable to thrive on vegan diets. Whether my proposed 
solution concerning cats would also apply to other carnivorous companions would depend on 
whether a given companion C was relevantly similar to cats in four ways. First, C would have to be 
a companion who could not survive on a vegan diet. Second, C would have to be able to survive on 
a diet containing the flesh of plausibly-sentient-NHAs, but not any definitely-sentient-NHAs. Third, 
C would have to be a companion who could be kept in a respectful way. Fourth, the selective 
H[WLQFWLRQ RI &¶V SRSXODWLRQ ZRXOG KDYH WR EH D EDG WKLQJ LQ WKH ZD\ that the extinction of cats 
would be. 
 
I have considered, but rejected, a rights-based solution which takes seriously the idea that size 
matters. Instead, I have suggested that it is better that cats eat some NHA to whom we likely have 
no obligations of justice than one to whom we certainly do. When we are dealing with cats, the 
ORFDWLRQRIWKH³ORZHUOLQH´LVQRWDPHUHDFDGHPLFFXULRVLW\EXWSRWHQtially, the difference between 
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their being able to live a life which does not necessitate the infliction of suffering or rights 
violations and otherwise. In the vegan state, the location of the lower line may be the difference 
between a state with cats and a state without them. However, I have argued that even if we are 
currently not certain if a NHA falls below the lower line, meaning that we should continue to avoid 
killing them, the need to feed our cats may represent an exception to this general prescription. To 
put it simply, we might say that our uncertainty about the existence of sentience in these NHAs 
means that we should not kill them when the gains from doing so are trivial (for instance, the 
satisfaction of our gastronomic curiosity), but that our uncertainty cannot preclude us from killing 
them when the gains from doing so would be relatively important, as they are if it allows us to avoid 
selective extinctionism. 
 
As an example practical suggestion, perhaps clams, oysters and mussels could be farmed or foraged 
on a large scale for cat food. It is a convenient fact that the three shellfish just mentioned can easily 
be farmed completely sustainably, hanging in the sea; they thrive in conditions which would 
represent the worst excesses of intensive farming if adapted for mammals, fish or birds. 
Furthermore, this production, unlike much intensive farming, does not have a strong adverse effect 
on the local or global environment, or local human or nonhuman communities. My proposal, to 
reiterate, is intended as a political, rather than individual, solution. The question of how we feed our 
companions has a political dimension, but this is easily overlooked. If the state is, as a demand of 
justice, to move towards a citizenship or rights framework for NHAs, or even if it is to adopt 
suffering- or environmental impact-reduction policies in relation to companion diets, it has a 
responsibility (unless it is prepared to endorse a selective extinctionist model) to facilitate and 
endorse the production of an alternative. This does not necessarily mean that the state is responsible 
for providing IRRGWRFDWV¶JXDUGLDQVEXW LWPD\PHDQWKDW WKHDOORFDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVWRUHVHDUFK
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and produce alternatives is appropriate. 
 
If I am correct that the use of plausibly-sentient NHAs works as an ethically-viable temporary 
solution to the problem of feeding carnivorous companions, then the key remaining issues are 
scientific. Consistent with the ultimate goal of a society in which no sentient NHA is killed for food, 
we must sHDUFKIRU1+$VWKHIOHVKRIZKLFKFRXOGIRUPWKHEDVLVRIFRPSDQLRQV¶GLHWVEXWZKLFK
we are justifiably certain are nonsentient. While such certainty is lacking, we must consider which 
NHAs are probably nonsentient, and, if they could form the basis of a suitable diet, we should, for 
now, endorse their use as food for our carnivorous companions. Simultaneously, research on the 
nutrients necessary for a healthy cat diet may be able to reveal that cats are able to thrive on a vegan 
diets; if this is so, then the problem has been averted, and, instead, we can endorse that cats (like 
humans and herbivorous/omnivorous companions) be fed solely vegan diets. Caution, however, is 
required: the scientific community has sometimes been slow to recognise the capacity for pain in 
certain NHAs, with controversy lasting for years over whether fish are sentient, which we now 
know them to be. This gives us reason to be cautious, and to adopt the exploitation of any animal, 
even one which we suspect lacks sentience, only when it would serve some genuinely important 
need ± certainly not gastronomic curiosity. Ultimately, I suggest that, if the choice is between the 
exploitation of likely non-sentient creatures and the extinction of certain kinds of companions who 
form real and valuable bonds with humans, we should choose the former. Humans in the developed 
world, by contrast, lose little in choosing not to eat oysters, grubs and the like, and so we have good 
reason to believe that justice demands that we should not. 
 
Previous veUVLRQV RI WKLV SDSHU KDYH EHHQ SUHVHQWHG DW WKH 4XHHQ¶V 8QLYHUVLW\ %HOIDVW
political theory reading group and The Political Theory of Food and Drink panel at the 
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2014 European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, University of 
Glasgow. My thanks to all who have discussed this issue with me on these or other 
occasions, especially David Archard, Jeremy Watkins, Matteo Bonotti, Emanuela Ceva and 
an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Social Philosophy. Finally, my thanks are owed to 
Katherine Wayne, who first got me thinking about companion animal diets. This work was 
undertaken while I was pursuing research funded by the Department of Employment and 
Learning, Northern Ireland. 
 
Josh Milburn is reading for a PhD in the School of Politics, International Studies and 
3KLORVRSK\ 4XHHQ¶V 8QLYHUVLW\ %HOIDVW +LV UHVHDUFK IRFXVHV RQ PRUDO DQG SROLWLFDO
philosophy, especially animal ethics, the philosophy of food and libertarian political theory. 
His research has previously been published in the European Journal of Political Theory and 
Res Publica, and is forthcoming in edited collections variously addressing companion 
animals, the ethics of food and aiding nonhuman animals in need. 
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